THE PROBLEM OF MOUNT EVEREST

(The first of the two papers printed below was submitted by the Eastern Section of the Himalayan Club to their representative on the Mount Everest Committee, and was not intended for publication. The views are so constructive towards the solution of the problem that the Editor obtained permission to publish them. In order to appreciate the problem fully, however, he felt that members of the Club would like to have Mr. Eric Shiptorfs comments on the suggestions made in the paper, and these are printed as a second contribution to the problem. Mr. Hugh Ruttledges views are summarized at the end of his paper, pages 14, 15 of this Journal.—Ed.)

1. Submitted by the Eastern Section, Himalayan Club
2. Discussion on the above paper By eric shipton
3. Note by Editor

 

 

I

(Submitted by the Eastern Section, Himalayan Club)

Without any intention to criticize destructively the magnificent achievements of past Mount Everest expeditions, we submit in the best possible spirit that the lessons of those expeditions should now induce the Mount Everest Committee to tackle the problem from fresh angles. In that spirit we express plainly our opinions and suggestions.

We are of opinion that past expeditions have been foredoomed to failure, if for no other reason, because they have attempted , to climb the north ridge too fast. Can it be expected that men who have stood up to severe conditions and hard work as far as the North Col should be able to climb the mountain in three days from there? Is it possible for them to climb first 3,000 feet, then 1,700 feet, in biting winds, living on Brand's Essence and condensed milk, and then to master the last difficult 1,700 feet of Mount Everest in one brief assault? We suggest that this procedure has proved to be impossible in the normal weather of Mount Everest.

The policy, we believe, arose out of the nature of the season selected for the attempt. May and June are subject both to storms of an approaching monsoon and to westerly disturbances. Fine periods of weather are likely to be short-lived. The assault parties have had to wait for a lull at the bottom of their climb before starting; and each day of the actual assault brought them rapidly nearer exhaustion and the next spell of bad weather.

The Plan on the Mountain.

Leaving aside for the moment questions of the best time of year for the attempt, let the evils of a 'rush assault' be examined; in our opinion they are as follows:

1. The climber has about five days in which to climb from 22,700 to 29,140 feet (29,002 feet—Ed,) and return.¹¹
2. Only two camps can be established on the Ridge.
3. The climber cannot start for the summit from a point higher than 27,400 feet.
4. He can acquire little of such acclimatization as may be possible at the 27,ooo-foot level.
5. He cannot delay on account of temporary indisposition without eliminating his chance in the final attempt.
6. Having failed in an attempt, the assault party must immediately evacuate Camp VI to make room for the next assault party, who have not the advantage of one or two nights to accustom themselves to life at 27,000 feet.
7. There is great danger in the retreat in bad weather owing to the distance between camps.
8. The so-called supporting party is of very little material help at any stage of the attempt.
9. A large number of porters are required to carry up the high camps, as they can only carry extremely light loads such long distances.
10. Some climbing effort is wasted in escorting porters down to the North Col.
11. There is insufficient time after each carry to build a habitable platform for Camps V and VI.

 

These difficulties are now considered in some detail.

1. Wyn Harris and Wager left the North Col on the 28th May 1933, arrived at Camp VI on the 29th, and by midday of the 30th their assault was finished, and they were on their way down in order to make room for Smythe and Shipton. They had a very restless and disturbed night at their highest camp, after which they had a few hours only in which to examine the 'second step', find out whether it could be turned on the ice of the south face, seek for a fault in the 'yellow band' along the north face, and make a bid for the summit.
   
   

   Smythe and Shipton left Camp IV on the 29th May, arrived at Camp VI the next evening, where they spent an uncomfortable night. Their supper consisted of four tins of Brand's Essence, a litde tinned fish, and some cafe-au-lait between the two of them. They could boil no water, and it took an hour to heat enough snow for a drink. They spent a second night together at Camp VI, but Smythe does not say that he felt any greater deterioration from the altitude after a second night at that height (see remarks under Deterioration). On the i st June they had no time to extend farther the first party's brief examination of the 'second step', but had to concentrate at once on Norton's route; after 5J hours their assault was finished and they were back in Camp VI.

   Judging from the condition of both the assault parties after the terrific strain, it is evident that stronger men could hardly be desired, and that had they been better acclimatized they must have succeeded even in the conditions of snow and wind experienced.

   It is considered that the strain of ascending in two days from the North Col to Camp VI has never yet placed the summit within striking distance. This is in no way intended as a criticism of the tactics of the 1933 expedition; on the contrary they were the best tactics that could be foreseen in the light of experience up to that time. It is, however, felt that a further lesson has been given.

2. As regards the difficulty of finding sites for camps above North Col, it is certain that camps can be fixed at the following heights of previous camps:
   
   25,000
   25,200
   25,700
   26,800
   27,400
   27,800 (snow patch observed in 1924).

   Doubtless a few other positions for camps could be found.

   We believe that camps should be established at proportionate heights and there should be more than two of them. For example:

   A at 24,400 feet, or 1,700	feet above	North Col.
   B at 25,700 feet, or 1,300	,,	Camp A. .
   C at 26,800 feet, or 1,100	,,	,, B.
   D at 27,800 feet, or 1,000	,,	,, C.

    

   The last would be 1,300 feet below the summit (more correctly 1,200 feet, since heights are referable to the summit height of 29,002, see footnote above.—Ed.).

   There would then be greater security in retreat in bad weather or exhaustion. There would be less strain during the ascent of the ridge. There would be more time in which to make the camps more comfortable after the day's carry. Fewer porters would be needed to establish the highest camps, because they would be able to carry more. The total weight need not be increased.

   As regards weight, it would no longer be necessary to place four tents at Camp V (25,700 feet) with food and bedding for eight porters. The same tents would be distributed between Camps A, B, and G. Once climbers are required to spend a certain number of days on the ridge, it does not greatly affect the total weight of food to be taken up from the North Col; it only modifies the altitudes to which the various food lots have to be taken. The same remarks apply to fuel. There will not be the same necessity to take four sleeping-bags right up to Camp VI as was done in 1933 to provide for the possibility of two assault parties being in the camp at the same time, because of the comparative ease with which one party can move up or down to the next camp.

3. It is almost impossible to attain the summit safely from 27,400 feet. The only way in which the climbers can camp nearer to the summit than 27,400 feet with certainty and allow enough time for the porters to get back safely is to have a higher intermediate camp above 25,700 feet (vide Longland's difficulty in getting the porters back in 1933).
4. The slower advance with more periods and longer periods of rest in the high camps will allow much better acclimatization in the last and most vital stages of the climb. Mr. Ruttledge has pointed out that oxygen-lack, cold, wind, fatigue, loss of appetite and sleep produce deterioration. The last six of these will be reduced by easier upward progress. There will thus be less deterioration. It has been decided by previous expeditions that delay in progress above the North Col produces more deterioration than can be balanced by the advantage gained from acclimatization. It is definitely postulated, however, at some length in a later section of these notes that acclimatization without deterioration does occur at much greater heights than has been admitted by previous expeditions. Causes of deterioration are easily confused and are difficult to separate, and we consider that they have not been sufficiently investigated from the data even available at present.
5. There is a narrow margin in the amount of food which can be taken to 27,400 feet, because the task of revictualling a high camp from far below is a heavy one. Thus the number of days which any assault party can remain in the highest camp is very limited, and no assistance is available in this direction from the support party. If a camp be fixed 1,000 feet below the top camp, it will not be impossible for a support party to bring up some extra food. As things were in 1933, the assault party were in the position that, if for any reason they could not get off and make a full-dress attack, or even a preliminary attack, on the morning after arrival, their whole assault was practically eliminated.
6. The forward assault party, instead of being assisted by the support party, have in effect their style cramped by it. After an initial attempt, after having to some extent accustomed themselves to the altitude, and after having familiarized themselves with the terrain and acquired experience of the problem, the assault party has to give way to the next assault party, which is coming up to take its place. The new assault party must then acquire its own experience and waste chances in doing so.
7. The provision of additional camps of even one light tent must enormously minimize the dangers of exposure in bad weather or of a return in an exhausted condition. With only one camp on the way down to the North Col this contingency must be kept firmly in mind and all the time must tend to emasculate the actual attempt. The addition of two more camps will render the climbing of Mount Everest less dependent on the lucky chance of ideal weather for a sufficient number of days at the right moment.
8. A supporting party placed a full day's exhausting climbing below the leaders and out of all communication can be of no material help to them. Whereas, if they were within 2| hours' reach of them, they can do a great deal in the way of consolidating Camp D, or by helping to shift it to a better position, examining alternative routes, assisting an exhausted climber down, reinforcing with a new man, and generally giving moral support. It might be considered whether one climbing party should not be allotted the task of acting primarily as a support party and only secondarily as an alternative assault party.¹²
   
   

   Footnote

   12 This, in brief, is the principle of reinforcing the first assault party from below, as opposed to the plan of 'leap-frogging' a second assault party over the first, when this has failed. The reinforcing of the assault was adopted with success on Nanda Devi.—Ed.

9. In 1933 four tents had to be taken to Camp V to house eight 'tigers' and three climbers. The carry up 3,000 feet from the North Col required sixteen porters, each taking a load of only 12 lb. The Col therefore had to provide for this force of porters at least and enough climbers to look after their safe return. It is considered that if the carry be reduced to 1,700 feet, each porter will be able to carry from 25 to 30 lb. and each climber 5 lb. of useful weight. Thus five or six porters would be required for the camps on the north ridge, instead of sixteen. The establishment of Camps A and B could be conducted from the North Col and the camps extremely lightly provisioned, and available weight saved in taking part of Camps C and D to B, the remainder of the food for A and B being brought up in a second relay.
   
   

   At most, three or four porters would be needed to go to Camp D (27,800 feet). It would seem altogether that the reduction in the number of porters required to go high would simplify the parties, make them more mobile, and prevent congestion at the North Col.

   The question of reducing the number of climbers is not discussed, as no doubt that aspect of the problem is being fully considered. On the other hand, experience shows that, as soon as a porter's limit of endurance is approached, either because of distance or exposure, his carrying capacity is reduced out of all proportion. With surprising rapidity he will reach a stage where he will carry nothing at all. We feel sure that by reducing his climb from 3,000 feet to 1,700 feet the porter will carry more than double the load, without very much affecting his speed, 3,000 feet being well beyond the most efficient distance for porterage at an altitude of 24,000 feet. Similar remarks apply to the next carry on Everest, where eight porters were used to bear one light tent, four sleeping-bags, and a little food.

10. Climbers need not be wasted in escorting porters down between the highest camps and the North Col. Those carrying up Camps C and D will proceed steadily to the highest point and be escorted down once only, while even if porters have to be escorted at all between Camps A and B, that can be done from the North Col.
11. After a long ascent and with a long journey back, there is no time to make Camp VI even reasonably comfortable. Given a shorter climb, time will allow a better platform to be built and a better position for Camp D to be found. Conditions will be more comfortable, and better rest will be gained for the task of the next day. Stones and scree are to be found on most parts of the north ridge, and there seems no reason why a very sound platform should not be made at each camp site.

Season.

The above is a discussion on the advantages of a gradual and deliberate advance up the ridge. Obviously this is only possible with more settled weather than there was in May 1933. The question of the season of the year is now discussed.

First, it cannot be said that 1933 was a very exceptional year unless all the previous years were exceptional also. The year 1936, however, was exceptional in that the monsoon arrived so early that it coincided with the usual period of western disturbances. It is clear that towards the approach of the monsoon there will generally be a few short spells of perfect conditions, and that for that period 'rush tactics' are a sine qua non.

The period after the monsoon is strongly recommended for the careful consideration of the Mount Everest Committee. Alternatively, if there is difficulty in obtaining permission for a post-monsoon attempt, the month of April should be considered.¹ There will, however, be certain other difficulties, which are dealt with below.

At both these seasons the periods of fine weather between disturbances are likely to be more prolonged; but, from present evidence, wind velocities are exceptionally high.—Ed.

 

1. Shorter days. The length of the days in the Mount Everest region are tabulated for ready reference
   

   15th April	12 hr.	35 min.
   15th May	13	10
   15th May	13	10
   15th June	13	35
   15th September	12	15
   15th October	11	25
   15th November	10	40

    

   The differences are not very great, and we suggest that the times are well above the amount that can be devoted to climbing in a single day. Moreover, the longer period of enforced rest in camp has been found in Sikkim to be definitely beneficial.

2. Increased wind velocity. Averages taken from Mr. Ruttledge's book serve as a sufficiently good guide.
   
   

   	Wind velocities in metres per second
   Month	at 26,000 feet	at 30,000 feet
   April1.	22.5	26.0
   May .	16.1	22.6
   June .	9.1	75
   September .	6.3	8.7
   October .	14.0	19.2
   November .	27.4	31.2

    

   It will be seen that the later the expedition'delays on the mountain after the monsoon the more severe will be the winds they encounter. On the other hand, the average wind in October is slightly less than in May, whereas it has often been assumed that the winds in October are much more severe.

3. Increasing cold with the approach of winter. Figures for temperature in the Mount Everest region are not available in the autumn. However, everywhere in the Northern Hemisphere temperatures are higher than in the spring, and there is every reason to suppose that October will be warmer than May.
   
   

   Mr. Cooke found that in 1935 on Kabru at above 20,000 feet throughout the month of November the more settled weather and extra sunshine much more than compensated for the shorter hours. A rise of temperature was observed during the month of November. Incidentally temperatures and winds during the second half of November 1935 at 23,000 feet compare favourably with those observed by Rubenson a month earlier in 1907. Cooke's temperatures were 12° F. milder. The seasons of 1907 and 1935 were not greatly dissimilar.

   ¹ See my note on pp. 124-6.-Ed.

   It is not always realized that variations of temperature due to the presence or absence of sun are greater near the tropics than in England, and that seasonal variations are less. Hence the amount of precipitation to be expected in October as compared with that in May is of the greatest importance to the question of temperature.

4. The amount of snow on the north face. In order to study the difficulty to be expected from the amount of snow on the north face of Everest after the monsoon, a comparison of the rainfall and the number of rainy days will be valuable. Snowfall is included.

Taking as a rough guide the mean of the average monthly rainfall and rainy days at the following observation stations in the Himalaya nearest to Mount Everest-Katmandu, Kalimpong, Gangtok, Darjeeling, Gyantse, and Mussoorie-we get:

 

Similar results have been clearly brought out by Kenneth Mason in his article in the Himalayan Journal, vol. viii, 1936.

The above results are of the utmost importance in deciding when to tackle Mount Everest. Wind is a difficulty which hampers climbing, but loose snow on Everest is an obstacle which entirely stops it.

It has been stressed that loose snow on the slabs renders them hazardous, and that therefore the mountain cannot be attacked unless the rocks are bare. Snow on the north face must become increasingly compacted by wind as precipitation becomes less, and it would be interesting to know what the members of past expeditions think of the possibilities if the snow on the slabs is firm. Except after a severe storm, experience shows that snow at high altitudes in Sikkim in the autumn is very firm indeed.

Taking all the above factors into account, we believe that the last portion of the climb on Everest would be most suitably attempted in the first week of November.

Acclimatization and Deterioration.

Coming to the question of acclimatization and deterioration, we suggest that the conclusions which have so far been arrived at regarding the limits of these have not at all been proven.

Miscalculation of the true and individual causes of deterioration has apparently contributed to the policy of rushing the peak. Deterioration from lack of oxygen simply after full acclimatization has not yet been discovered.

Acclimatization is not merely a physiological change; it is a building-up. Amongst other effects of altitude, the system tends to be anaemic. The blood-count has to be more than doubled, for which the body has work to do and tissue to consume. If the process is forced to take place rapidly, there must be temporary wasting, particularly when there is a lack of nourishment, aggravated by the temporary distaste for food. Any man taken rapidly to a height well above his acclimatized height must deteriorate until such time as his condition becomes acclimatized enough for him to improve. Any deterioration observed above the North Col is not due so much to the primary effects of lack of oxygen as to the secondary effects of it. Briefly, deterioration is a symptom of the processes of violent acclimatization.

The effects of acclimatization which bring about deterioration are the consumption of bodily tissue in the process of manufacturing more blood corpuscles, lack of sleep, with its wear on the nerves, and cold from the lowering of the metabolic rate with its drain on bodily energy and tissue.

An acclimatized man will not lack sleep, he will eat good food, he will keep warmer, and his brain will function fully; consequently he will not deteriorate. We suggest that as acclimatization nears completion, deterioration ceases, and the climber proceeds to replace at least a fair percentage of his wasted tissues. The remedy for deterioration, therefore, is to proceed slow enough, and to allow acclimatization to take place slow enough, to prevent the system from being overtaxed. Alternatively, if the body is acclimatizing rapidly, it should be given rest.

The ideal of acclimatizing without deteriorating cannot, of course, be realized on Everest; but if the above arguments are sound, they point strongly to a policy of a slow advance rather than to one of a rush attack, of deliberate rather than violent progress.

It may be objected that according to these arguments there is no limit to the height to which acclimatization can take place. We would say that within heights measurable on Everest there is no limit save time. It is not, of course, argued for a moment that a fully acclimatized man at 27,000 feet has the same powers as a normal man at sea-level.

That the factor of time is involved in the process of acclimatization is evident for the following reasons: (1) the greater the height the greater the acclimatization to be achieved, and (2) the slower the last stages of that acclimatization will become; (3) the greater the height, the greater will be the departure from a normal state when once acclimatized. Thus at great altitudes increased time is needed for the climber to become accustomed to them. In fact acclimatization seems to follow a kind of logarithmic law: its last stages are extremely slow, as may be instanced by the improvement reported by officers stationed in Tibet after six months or even a year.

A few extracts are quoted from records of previous Mount Everest expeditions.

The general level was pretty high as shown by the number of men fit for hard work on the North Col, and by the comparative absence of lassitude, distress, sleeplessness, and loss of appetite at any except the highest camps. (Ruttledge, Everest 1933, p. 217.)

The state of the party here bears no comparison with the desperate state of the porters on and above the North Col in previous years, and it was due, of course, to Mr. Ruttledge's excellent policy, fully explained in his book, of advancing slowly and steadily right away back from the foot-hills through Tibet, and up to the North Col. His policy of advancing slowly to Camp IV was so successful that it is a pity that it could not be pursued up to the last camp.

However, on p. 218, Mr. Ruttledge says:

Every man who made more than one ascent of the north arete found that he went better the first time than the second. This is clear evidence that the limit of acclimatization had been passed. Oxygen-lack, cold, wind, fatigue, discomfort, loss of appetite, and loss of sleep must eventually cause deterioration. The first five were unavoidable anywhere above Camp II.

As regards this statement, we would at once point out that here are several causes of deterioration. They act in different ways and must individually produce different kinds of deterioration. Cold, wind, fatigue produce their own deterioration, due to exposure, which is not a pure height effect. Further deterioration, not acting in quite the same direction, is produced while acclimatizing to the new height. It might be regarded as a different deterioration acting together with the first, the two aggravating each other.

Taking the causes of deterioration separately, i.e. exposure and height: Exposure is dependent entirely on weather, that is to say, on unsettled conditions. By choosing a more settled time of year, that form of deterioration should be reduced. Doubtless, also, further improvement can be made in the comfort of life at the North Col. With fewer porters and perhaps fewer climbers there should be opportunity for a less crowded and better-equipped camp.

Height deterioration by no means prevents men from existing at the highest camps for more than three or four nights, as will be evident from the following.

Smythe and Ship ton spent a very unrestful first night at 27,000 feet After a second night Smythe makes no mention of obtaining less rest, or of noticing signs of serious deterioration. After a third night he says (p. 167): 'It was 6 p.m. when I turned in and it was not until 7 a.m. that I woke after the best night that I had yet had above the North Col.⁵ The important conclusion from this seems to be clearly that even at 27,000 feet he had not passed the 'limit of acclimatization’.

Similarly OdelPs very good acclimatization in 1924 (it was slow and presumably did not therefore overtax his system in other ways, thus producing little deterioration) is proof that the North Col is not beyond the 'limit of acclimatization'. Mr. Ruttledge admits (p. 219): 'we can offer no exact parallel to Odell's example. Our slow acclimatizers did improve, but were never tested fully.'

Each Mount Everest expedition has come back with the opinion that acclimatization occurs up to a greater height than we thought possible from the previous expedition.

The Nanda Devi expedition also throws interesting light on the subject. Here the party advanced slowly, spending altogether twenty-five days on the mountain. The degree of acclimatization was such that the climbers themselves did most of the carrying and established the last two camps entirely by themselves.

Deterioration from exposure must be greatly dependent on the precipitation of snow. In spite of times when winds are severe, the general condition of the North Col camp will be much more sunny and clear of loose snow and drift in the months of October and November. The resulting improvement and lessening of hardship in many petty ways will need no elaboration. The combined effect must be beneficial both morally and physically.

We trust that these arguments for a later attempt will be weighed carefully. We do not by any means pretend that they are a solution of the problem, but we put them forward for what they are worth, because in some respects they approach it from a new angle.

 

 

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II

Discussion on the above paper By eric shipton

I wish to submit this brief review in the same friendly spirit that the authors have offered their suggestions. I will deal with the three main headings of the paper in the reverse order, since, before any plan of action above Camp III can be drawn up, it is necessary to make up one's mind quite definitely upon (1) the factors of acclimatization and deterioration, and (2) the time of year at which the attempt will be made.

Deterioration.

The authors' arguments are wholly based on the theory that a fully acclimatized man will not deteriorate at any altitude below the top of Everest. I have not been able to discover any evidence whether from personal experience, personal observation, or secondhand information, to support this theory, except perhaps Odell's claim to have been fitter after his sojourn at above 25,000 feet than before it. All my evidence points to the fact that although a man may live for a prolonged period at 21,000 feet without suffering any appreciable deterioration, he cannot live at or above 23,000 feet without losing muscle, tissue, and energy, at an alarming rate. This view is supported by all the physiologists with whom I have discussed the matter.

I will mention only a small portion of that evidence which is based on personal experience. When I took up residence at Camp IV on the North Col in 1933, I consider that I was fully acclimatized to that altitude (see next paragraph). The party remained in that camp for the four days succeeding our occupation of it. During this time I had an average of io| hours' unbroken sleep each night. On the fifth day Smythe and I went up the north ridge. We both agreed that we were feeling almost as fit as if we had been in the Alps. We climbed without effort at a rate of nearly 1,000 feet an hour. The second time I went up the north ridge, two days later, I felt distinctly less fit. The third time I was weaker still, and the fourth time, fourteen days after our occupation of Camp IV, it was only with very great difficulty that I succeeded in reaching Camp V. This deterioration continued, and when I reached Camp VI I was so weak that I offered to give up my place in the second assault party to either Wyn Harris or Wager, though they were both too exhausted to take this on. On returning to the Base Camp after six weeks of the first attempt I estimated that I had lost two stone in weight. I did several climbs after this, the last of which was nearly two months later, but even then I had not recovered my strength. It is my opinion that all those who went high that year suffered from similar deterioration, though in Smythe's case to a lesser degree.

2. In 1933 we spent 3 weeks at Darjeeling, at about 7,000 feet, 3 weeks in Sikkim between 6,000 and 15,000 feet,
   4 weeks in Tibet, at an altitude of about 15,000 feet, and went several times to 18,000 and 19,000 feet,
   2 weeks between 16,800 and 21,000 feet,
   2 weeks at Camp III, 21,000 feet, working from there up to 23,000 feet,
   2 weeks on the North Col and at Camp V before making the attempt.
   
   

   This can hardly be called 'rush tactics', and yet deterioration at 23,000 feet was very severe. (N.B. Longland, a slow acclimatizer, spent only one night above the North Col during the whole expedition, but lost a tremendous amount of muscle and did not recover his strength.)

   The Kamet expedition in 1931 reached the summit of Kamet (25,447 feet) in exactly two weeks after arriving at its base camp (15,800 feet). The march to the mountain had only once taken the party as high as 12,000 feet (Kuari pass). Only one member had had previous Himalayan experience.

   There is, in my opinion, ample reason for believing that deterioration is a great deal more rapid above 23,000 feet than at that elevation.

3. It would be interesting to know what the authors of the paper consider a reasonable time for acclimatization up to 23,000 feet. The Nanda Devi expedition of 1936 is mentioned. It should be remembered that the highest camp on that climb was at 23,800 feet. It was in the nature of a bivouac, and was occupied for a very short time. Therefore they can have had very little time above the altitude where deterioration sets in. I quote from the paper above: 'They advanced slowly and spent 25 days on the mountain.' This is little more than half the time which we spent above our Base Camp in 1933 on our first attempt.
4. Much has been said regarding lack of sleep at high altitudes. I never had the slightest difficulty in sleeping the clock round, provided I was comfortable. If I was uncomfortable I slept very badly. The two nights I was with Smythe at Camp VI were spent in extreme discomfort owing to the sloping ground and to the almost incessant rolling of one man on the top of his companion. I slept hardly at all. I am convinced that Smythe's thirteen-hour sleep the night after I had left him was due, not to any better acclimatization, as has been suggested, but to the fact that he had four sleeping-bags and the whole tent to himself, that is, he was in perfect comfort.
5. In my opinion no efforts should be spared to furnish future expeditions with a better understanding of the physiological problems of high altitudes. This would entail a great deal of research by competent scientists.

The Season.

The possibilities of attempting the mountain in October and even November and December should most certainly be examined. However, until more information has been obtained regarding conditions on Everest itself during these months, we cannot put all our eggs into this basket, and the main effort must be pre-monsoon. I hope, however, that if the next pre-monsoon attempt fails, the party will not return without having obtained some post-monsoon data. I am satisfied that during the monsoon the mountain should be left alone.

The figures supplied by the authors of the paper are most valuable and instructive.

The Plan on the Mountain.

All the questions referred to above were discussed and re-discussed innumerable times by the leader and members of last year's party. It was finally decided to place three camps above the North Col: Camp V at 25,700 feet; Camp VI at the foot of the 'yellow band', at 27,000 feet; Camp VII at the foot of the 'first step' at 27,800 feet. It was decided that the close proximity of these camps to one another would justify our not having a European in charge of returning porters. I discussed with Ang Tharkay, Rinzing, and others of the porters the question of weights of loads above the North Col. We decided that the porters carrying to Camp V could easily manage 25-lb. loads (actually the porters suggested 30-lb. loads); those who were to go beyond Camp V were to carry less up to that point. It was decided to stock all camps with food and fuel for at least a week, if possible at the first, and probably the only, carry.

The recommendations of the authors agree with the conclusions reached at our discussions last year, except in the vital question of deterioration, which is probably the chief factor in planning the assault on the mountain. For my part, far from wishing to increase the length of time during which climbers stayed on and above the North Col in 1933, I am strongly in favour of reducing it as much as possible, though I think that three camps above that point are necessary.

There is one minor point. In the elaboration of point (1) of the assault-plan section, the authors say: 'Had they been better acclimatized they must have succeeded even in the conditions of snow and wind experienced.' I think that it is agreed by those who have been on those upper slabs that, from the ordinary mountaineering standpoint, an attempt to climb them, even by a fit party, would be unjustifiable when they are covered by deep powder snow, or when a really bad wind is blowing.

 

 

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Note by Editor

Perhaps I may be permitted to add a few words to the discussion, regarding weather conditions both before and after the monsoon.

Expeditions have sometimes been criticized for not arriving earlier at the base camp, in order to take advantage of the finer weather in April; while there is an increasing body of opinion which favours an attack after the monsoon, due partly, no doubt, to successes on lower mountains south of the Great Himalaya.

In the table of wind velocities on p. 116 the figure for April at 30,000 feet is not greatly in excess of that for May. But it must be remembered that these figures are averages. Evidence of wind and weather conditions collected by the Mount Everest Flight during March and April 1933 tells rather a different story. We know that western disturbances are severe in the north-western Himalaya throughout April and that they last into May; and we know that the farther east we go, the less prolonged and the less severe they are. In 1933 these disturbances came from the west, in regular succession, reaching a climax in about ten days in the Everest region during March and April, and brought cloud, rain, and high winds. After the climax the sky cleared, but wind velocities remained high, so much so that no flight could be attempted during the first few days of fine weather. During the fine-weather spell the wind gradually abated, and for a few days flying, and presumably climbing, was possible.

It will be remembered that on the 3rd April the wind, during one of these spells, dropped for the first time to 58 miles an hour at 25,000 feet, and the flight was successfully carried out. On the 4th the flight was made to Kang- chenjunga, in less favourable conditions; by the 5th the weather had begun to deteriorate again at high altitudes; and it was not till the 19th April that conditions improved sufficiently for the second flight to Everest, though the wind was still estimated at over 80 miles an hour at 25,000 feet. It is admitted that the year 1933 was not abnormal. My own opinion, after studying available evidence, is that very high winds will be experienced throughout the periods of clear weather during the month of April.

If we now consider October, we find the west winds re-establishing themselves after the retreat of the monsoon. During the early days of the month the winds are less strong than those at the end of April or the beginning of May; towards the end of October, however, the west wind has apparently re-established itself and is now considerably stronger than at the end of May. In other words, in May the west wind is decreasing in strength owing to the advancing monsoon currents, while in October it is increasing in strength very rapidly owing to their absence. A high-pressure system has already taken the place of low pressures, and there must be increasingly high winds from the west. This rapid increase at the end of October is shown by the great increase in average wind velocities, shown in the table, in November compared with October.

The point is that a strong wind is essential on Everest to clear the slabs and rocks of snow. Having done so, the wind must abate sufficiently to permit men to traverse the slabs and climb the final rocks. Before the monsoon this seems to be theoretically possible, for there should normally be a lull, sufficiently long, when the wind has cleared the rocks and before the monsoon has re-covered them. In a normal year, if there is one, or possibly in an abnormal one when an early monsoon approaches but is delayed, it is theoretically possible to have such a period, perhaps as long as from four to six weeks, say from the 1st May to the 15th June, though during the earlier part of this period winds will still be far too strong for work above the North Col.

After the monsoon, with increasing winds, conditions are different. Winds at first will not be strong enough to clear the rocks of snow. Until they do so climbing is impossible. Later, when the winds are strong enough to clear the rocks they will be too strong for climbing, and there are no conditions favouring a lull. All accounts of winter conditions in Tibet lay stress on the violent west winds, and there are no conditions that favour their abatement high up on Everest.

It would, of course, be most valuable to have exact observations throughout the post-monsoon months; and it is to be sincerely hoped that an opportunity will occur in 1938 for examining the problem on the spot. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that conditions on lower mountains, and on mountains south of the Great Himalayan divide, particularly where the problem is not one of clearing snow from rocks, give us very little guidance.

So many factors enter into the problem of Mount Everest that he would be a rash man who would lay down any law, or who would press his view too strongly in the face of different opinion. Few men have studied the problem in greater detail than the leader of the 1933 and 1936 expeditions. He sounds a note of warning in his summary of the results of the 1936 attempt.¹ We have also the experience of the German expeditions to Kangchenjunga and Nanga Parbet. Early in their paper on the ascent of Siniolchu, they gave their views on the question of small, compact parties, drawing a distinction between high peaks and the highest peaks.¹³ We have also in this Journal an account of the very fine achievement on Nanda Devi, by an effective party of seven climbers. There is a lusty independence of spirit in their ardent desire for a small party; but, without in any way detracting from their magnificent achievement, it must be remembered that the summit of Nanda Devi is lower than Camp V on Mount Everest, and over 2,400 feet below the difficult rocks of the final climb. Three of the seven were temporarily incapacitated on Nanda Devi; two of the seven reached the summit. The opinion of many who have been high is that the real strain begins at over 24,000 feet; on Nanda Devi there are 1,650 feet of strain, on Mount Everest there are 5,000 feet of it.

No one knows these matters better than those who have to solve the problem, and it is only right that the leader once chosen should be left to choose his party and make his plan. Each leader will have different views from his predecessor. Six expeditions have now been made to the region, and four attacks made on the mountain. Mallory, I believe, used to say that it was fifty to one against any particular attempt being successful. A good leader will reduce but not eliminate the odds against him.

 

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