NOTES

1. The Problem of Mount Everest
2. Possible Alternative to Traill's Pass
3. Khillanmarg Avalanches, 1945
4. Tours in Sikkim and Tibet
5. German Expeditions and Italian Prisoners of War

 

 

I should like to refer back to the late Editor's Notes which appeared under the above heading in the 1939 Journal. I apologize for the time-lag, but for most of 1939 I was away, and after that there were other matters which though, perhaps, of less importance, demanded immediate attention. Moreover, Everest is unfortunately still a subject of perennial interest.

In his notes Professor Mason, whose Editorship set so unattainable a standard and whose loss we shall all feel, disclaims criticism and appeals to facts. But his facts are selected and he ignores my main contention, which was that previous expeditions had been unnecessarily elaborate and expensive, and in consequence harmful to the interest of mountaineering. Apart from hazarding some strictures on false economy in the matter of food he devotes his argument mainly to the size of the party, and neglects the how and why. I admit that expense is not an absolute criterion, but we live in a commercial age and as a measure of relative efficiency it is a fair yardstick, and has a great bearing on our whole attitude towards these expeditions.

In 1938, at a cost of £2,000 odd against the £10,000 odd of previous years, we occupied Camp VI with two parties of two who were as well equipped and as fit to make a bid for the top as the parties of 1924 and 1933. Professor Mason correctly quotes my modest claim, 'that a small party run on modest lines has proved itself as likely to reach the top as a large expensive one,' and he then proceeds to refute a far less modest claim which was never made. 'There is no evidence whatever', he says, ‘to show that with fine weather either of these two parties would have been any more successful than the two parties which went higher and farther in 1933.’ Nor is there any evidence, one might fairly retort, to show that they would not. And then, knowing full well the impossible snow conditions above Camp VI in 1938, he gratuitously adds, 'in truth, the 1938 party did not get as far as Norton's party in 1924 or Ruttledge's in 1933, and it would be rash to assume that it could have succeeded where Mallory failed.' Again, no one is asked to make such a rash assumption. I merely claim that at a fifth of the cost, had we had equal snow conditions, we were no more and no less likely to succeed than the others.

To come now to the number of climbers in the party; there is really not a great deal in it. In 1938, when I plumped for seven, I might have said with Clive that I was astonished at my own moderation. A full-blooded revolutionary, a root-and-branch reformer might have taken only five. Professor Mason, after discussing the question fully, comes down in favour of ten. For my part, I would have eight as a maximum and would consider six or seven adequate, but whether you have six, eight, or ten the party can still be 'big' or 'small', depending upon how it is run. Allowing for two parties of two for the attempt, a party of eight has a reserve strength of 100 per cent., which should be enough for anyone. The men start out fit, are presumably capable of taking care of themselves, and coughs and colds are not so devastating as Professor Masori would have us believe. His figure of ten is an improvement on the four previous parties, which were respectively thirteen, twelve, sixteen, twelve. He also apparently agrees that non-climbing leaders, base doctors, transport officers and wireless officers are unnecessary luxuries.

He quotes against me the case of the Nanda Devi party' of eight as a 'small light party', with the implication that since the mountain was only of moderate height the party was on all-fours with the large Everest parties. It was undoubtedly extremely light—it had to be, with only six Sherpa porters who all faded out at 21,000 feet. The point made is that out of eight only two reached the summit. Surely we are not expected to put the whole party on top. And in this case there were three others fit enough and in position to make the attempt had the first party failed or had weather conditions justified a longer stay on the mountain. The number eight was arrived at fortuitously, not by reasoning, and was perhaps dictated by political rather than tactical necessities. There were four Americans coming, so it was thought that they should be balanced by four Englishmen. There is a further consideration that of the eight only one had been above 23,000 feet (twelve years before) and only one other had had Himalayan experience, so that allowance had to be made for possible acclimatization failures. This is a point which may have to be borne in mind by future Mount Everest parties, for in the past there has usually been a small nucleus of three or four climbers who had proved themselves able to go high, but owing to the passage of time and the war it seems likely that in the next party there is bound to be a larger proportion of unknown quantities. The same will apply to the Sherpas, since there has been little high climbing done during the war. Professor Mason ignores the number of Sherpas employed on the mountain, another factor which distinguishes 'large' parties from 'small’. On Nanda Devi we had six, on Everest in 1938 we had thirty, while previous parties had eighty or ninety.

Professor Mason and others indulge in much wild talk about faulty, unscientific diet, starvation tactics and living on roots. If the reader turns to page 2 of the 1939 Journal, where there is a short account of what we ate in 1938, he will wonder what the Professor means and what members of expeditions really expect. Perhaps the seven lean years of rationing will have helped them to modify their ideas. I have not checked it, but I think it is true to say that in 1938 we were the first to eat bacon and eggs on the North Col. As regards quantity, the scale was 2 lb. a man, and I defy any normal man to eat on an average more than this, or, having eaten it, to suffer from hunger. In fact, this figure could probably be cut to lb. without anything but a beneficial effect on health and mobility. On Polar expeditions where conditions are more severe, the work as hard and the period more prolonged, the ration varies from 25 to 33 oz. Shipton and I like our food as well as anyone, and I am of the opinion of Dr. Johnson, that the man who does not mind his belly will scarcely mind anything else. For many years now I have believed, with the Food Reformers, that most of our modern ill health is due to faulty feeding— to the almost complete absence of fresh natural food in the average diet in favour of preserved, processed, devitalized food. But the effects of unbalanced faulty diet are long term—general ill health is the result of months or years of wrong feeding—and if Professor Mason had thought for a moment he would not have attributed the coughs, colds and sore throats, which afflicted us on arriving at Rongbuk to the food we had been eating for a mere three weeks since leaving Sikkim. Three weeks on bread and water would hardly have this effect; indeed, it is well known, or should be well known, that coughs and colds are usually the result of over-eating. He goes even farther and attributes all the minor ailments from which I have ever suffered, including the inability to go higher than 23,000 feet in 1935 and presumably the malaria I had in ^x939j ^to this same faulty, unscientific diet. Surprising though it may seem, we did in 1938 take some thought for the morrow, what we should eat. True, a hearty attempt was made to break away from the 'tin' tradition, but no one was condemned to a course of grazing, and austerity was neither practised nor preached. On the contrary, the food was varied, adequate and approved by a dietician, Dr. A. L, Bacharach. Fresh natural food is what matters, and though on an expedition a certain amount of tins and chemicals are unavoidable the fewer the better.

Some of Professor Mason's other Notes are vitiated with this 'small party' phobia. One finds it in the Note on the disaster on K2, the lesson of which, he urges, advocates of the small mobile party should take to heart. Leadership and faulty tactics have nothing to do with the size of the party, and Professor Mason studiously refrains from any comment on the highly successful and eyen smaller expedition to K2 in 1938. There is not always safety in numbers. Both the German expeditions to Nanga Parbat which ended in disaster were on the lavish scale of a Mount Everest expedition, and their losses were consequently all the heavier. Even Col. Strutt, of whom as one of the old school one would have expected better, is bitten with this small party phobia. In reviewing a book in the 1940 Journal he remarks, 'the lack of success of some—so-called—"light" parties can in large measure be attributed to incipient starvation provoked by lack of porters and the consequent urge to live on roots'. I am not quite sure to which expedition this tribute is paid, but food happens to be one of the things of which the minimum weight required is accurately known and upon which economies are not likely to be made. Excess of food is as bad as excess of anything else. Every additional porter means another one to carry his food, and so on ad infinitum. But Col. Strutt's infection was only recent and was probably a direct result of Professor Mason's Notes, for in the 1939 Journal he begins, his review of Himalayan Assault, the story of the French expedition, with the words, Tt is the tale of an expedition, overloaded with stores and personnel, struggling bravely against continuous bad weather.' He might have said the same of all the Everest expeditions.

Like Professor Mason, I disclaim criticism, but I feel that his ex cathedra condemnation of the modest scale expedition, which has held the field unanswered for seven years, may be thought by some to have settled the matter once and for all. I agree with him that regard must be had to the objective; that a party engaged in mountain exploration, for example, is not the same as a party attempting one of the Himalayan giants. But that is self-evident, and it is the scale of Mount Everest expeditions which is at issue and which in 1938 we endeavoured to show had always been extravagantly large. We tried to save the Mount Everest Committee from the unfortunate necessity of having to sell their souls to that newspaper which would pay most, with the attendant consequences of ^'bally-hoo' and wireless transmitting sets, and their baleful effects upon the climbers concerned and climbing everywhere. I maintain we showed that the mountaineering virtues of simplicity and economy are not incompatible with a serious attempt upon Mount Everest, and I think it will be a retrograde step if we ever revert to the grandiose standards of earlier expeditions.

H. W. Tilman.

 

 

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Some information which might interest members was gathered by J. G. Donaldson in June 1945.

The traditional way of crossing from the Pindari glacier to the Johar (Milam) valley is over Traill's pass (17,430 feet), a mountaineering route which takes four days. It is described in Heim and Gansser's Throne of the Gods (and see H.J., vol. i, p. 80).

In August 1926, after an expedition to Kailas in Tibet, H. Ruttledge and Golonel Wilson crossed Traill's pass from the Johar side to Phurkia. They had with them a party of four Bhotias from Martoli village in Johar, headed by Diwan Singh Martolia who was well known as a guide. These four were dismissed at Phurkia to return to their village, and advised to go by the safe Namik route. They had ropes and some equipment with them. Instead they struck up east from Phurkia, slept the first night below the snow-line, and keeping south of Nanda Kot found themselves by mid-day next day in the Shalang Gad, and were in their village Martoli the same evening.

In June 1945 J. C. Donaldson was camping at Martoli and heard this story from Ram Singh, one of the party. The route was described as easier and safer than Traill's pass, as well as shorter. Donaldson went with Ram Singh to look at the approach up the Shalang Gad. This they found opened at the top into a broad grazing valley, with impressive close-up view of Nanda Kot. There was a path all the way. The glacier was reached at about the level of Karbasya. Ram Singh indicated his first pass as lying somewhere to the south of Bhital Gwar on the opposite side of the glacier. It looked not formidable, and not over 16,000 feet. His account of it was that, after crossing and descending a little, one would find a fairly level snow-field (on which they had roped) rising to another pass of about the same height or a little higher. From there it would be possible to go down either into the Khaphini valley or to Phurkia. Donaldson and Ram Singh climbed up the side of Shalang Dhura in the hope of a view of it, but were not successful. Time from Martoli to the point in the valley reached by them was 5 ½ hours.

The story was confirmed by Diwan Singh Martolia,¹ now living at Birthi, some way off. But it is not absolutely clear which side of Nandakhani (19,780 feet) the route is supposed to run; probably the south. It looks intricate, particularly if it were tackled from Phurkia and to one who has seen the rocky ground of that side. If it was really done by these men it was a very creditable achievement.

 

Later in the year Donaldson was able to visit Phurkia and make the following further observations:

A party would certainly need tents.

The Bhotias could not have seen Phurkia from the crest of the pass. It is tucked right under the hillside. As Ruttledge in 1926 is said not to have stopped at Phurkia, but to have camped on the west side of the Pindar, near Martoli, what the Bhotias probably could see was Martoli. They were unfamiliar with the valley and applied the name Phurkia, which is better known. The most promising start for the pass on this side would therefore seem to be from Martoli. From the point 1 of the height shown 12,520 on the new J-inch sheet, looking up the Shel Changuch glacier, one sees what look like two practicable passes somewhere near the point marked 15,020. This would be a promising part to start exploration. The locals reported a rumour that a shepherd had crossed that way last year.

 

 

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IN the spring of 1936 an avalanche obliterated the former Ski Club hut at Khillanmarg (described in H.J., vol. ix, p. 163). On the 28th February 1945 avalanches occurred covering roughly the same ground, but of a somewhat different character. The snow started to fall on the 24th February and continued with a high veering wind over the next days. At the same time the temperature rose, and the interior of Khillan hut, which was occupied by instructors and pupils of Aircrew Mountain Centre Skiing Course, became almost unbearably stuffy. On the afternoon of the 28th February Khillan hut was put out of bounds to all by the Chief Instructor at Gulmarg, in view of the uncertain conditions; but before any definite arrangements had been made for evacuation the avalanches fell. The main fall, at 3.45 p.m., was from half-way up the centre of Apharwat, sweeping the marg to within 50 yards of the hut, and on the other side damaging trees beyond the Red Run (width of about 300 yards). This may have started a second fall which took place about 10 seconds later from the gullies to the left, the other side of the Catchment Area fence. Christmas Gully, above and to the right of the hut, had avalanched when it was inspected next day, but at what time it is impossible to say. The hut was immediately evacuated and not re-occupied for a week.

These were the only serious avalanches during the whole spring, and it is interesting to compare them with the 1936 fall. In this case the avalanched snow was in block form, not dust as before, and its limits were clearly defined. It would seem that the strong veering wind driving snow into the gullies and compacting it at steep angles, together with a high temperature, was enough to give the necessary conditions. Then a small portion slipping off and undercutting the rest, or a minor slide from above, would set the whole mountain-side in motion. Or the finishing touch may have been given by the shift in wind direction at midday on the 28th. The chowkidar of Khillan hut, who up to that time had shown no signs of anxiety, became immediately agitated when the wind started to blow from, instead of towards, the mountain. His brother was killed in the 1936 fall.

 

 

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The following notice is published at the request of Angtharkay. (For the many who desire to make the most of a short time in Sikkim his services as Sirdar may be called invaluable):

'Travellers wishing me to make arrangements for them for transport and/or servants for touring in Sikkim or Tibet are requested to supply the following information:

Particulars.

1. Route proposed, or area to be visited.
2. Itinerary and starting-point.
3. Whether using Dak Bungalows or tents.
4. Total weight of kit and transport requirements, i.e. riding ponies, mules or coolies.
5. Number of party, including personal servantsif any.
6. Whether cook, tiffin coolie, or sweeper required.

Rates. Travellers are advised that the rates will be as follows:

1. Riding pony Rs. 10 per day.
2. Transport mules Rs. 6 per day.
3. Cook Rs. 5 per day.
4. Coolie Rs. 3 per day.
5. Sweeper Rs. 3 to Rs. 3-4 per day.

These rates are subject to fluctuations, which will be notified in advance. Half rates will be charged for transport returning unladen. There will be a 25 per cent, extra charge for days spent above the snow-line.

Passes. Travellers are advised to apply at least one month in advance for Dak Bungalow passes from the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling. It will also be necessary to obtain from the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok, Sikkim frontier passes for each member of the party, and, if visiting Tibet, special permits to enter Tibet. These should also be applied for from one to two months in advance of the starting date. If it is intended to leave the 'beaten track' (Dak Bungalow routes), or cross the frontier into Tibet, the Political Officer will require a medical certificate in the form to be obtained from him.

Food. Very few supplies are available in Sikkim or Tibet and practically none at all off the beaten track. It is, therefore, advisable to supplement tinned and other ordinary stores with a supply of fresh vegetables, eggs, butter, flour and a few chickens, which will be arranged for from Darjeeling or Gangtok if required, at the current market rates. The above-quoted rates for coolies, ponies, &c. are inclusive of food along the Dak Bungalow routes, but extra food for them will be required for portions of the journey beyond the beaten track plus the additional transport involved. The extra food will be arranged by me, if desired, at the current market rates.

Correspondence. During my absence, correspondence addressed to me in Darjeeling will be dealt with by my wife Ang Yang Tsen. Telegrams may be addressed to me: Angtharkay, Bhutia Basti, .Darjeeling.'

Angtharkay Sirdar,
Lama Villa,
Bhutia Basti, Darjeeling.

 

 

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The expedition of three Germans to Sikkim has been recorded earlier in this number. Ernst Grob, a Swiss, returned to Germany and his book was published in Munich in 1940. His companions were interned, and tradition will always have it that one escaped from the camp at Dehra Dun and wanders still as a nomad in Tibet; while the other returned and gave himself back to captivity.

We have not yet been able to get details of the German expedition operating in 1939 in the Kashmir-Karakoram area.

The Italian Prisoners of War at the Yol camp, Kangra valley, succeeded in organizing during 1944 and 1945 a series of most ingenious expeditions to the hills. A record of these, illustrated with some remarkable drawings and sketch-maps, was produced. But a shortened account which was to have been available for this number has not yet appeared.

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